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Non-Technical Summary
Patents are intellectual property rights to exclude others from using an innovation and to recoup the
investment into R&D. However, this right has no purpose if it is not enforced against infringement
which is in turn a costly process with strategic elements. This paper analyzes the determinants of patent
infringement suits in Germany.
At the beginning, a short introduction into the German patent system and the litigation system explains
that the system is highly centralized because of the necessity of jurisdictionally and technically experienced
judges. Two special features of the system make it especially interesting to analyze the determinants of
patent litigation in Germany: First, there is a strict separation between enforcement after infringement of
a valid patent on one hand and enforcement after attacking the validity of the patent directly by means of
opposition or annulment on the other hand. This is different to the U.S. and most other patent systems of
the world. A second more technical speciality is the parallel existence of two patent systems, the German
and the European with only one enforcement system, the national district courts.
Analyzing the determinants patent litigation, I follow a selection model of Priest und Klein (1984) with
symmetric information and diverging expectations about the winning probabilities. Litigation is assumed
to be a failure of settlement in pre-trail negotiations. The model predicts that the differences in the
expected values will lower the likelihood of settlement and raise the probability of litigation. The main
hypotheses state that the parties will go to trial if their expected return net of legal costs will be equal
or larger than the expected outcome of a settlement. These expected values depend mainly on the value
of the patent, the characteristics of the patentees and the technological and economic conditions.
The empirical analysis employs a data set of 714 patent infringement suits encompassing 824 patents.
The suits were filed at two of the three main district courts in Germany, Mannheim and Du¨sseldorf
in 1993 to 1995. In order to analyze the determinants of patent litigation a control group has been
created. For each litigated patent one unlitigated patent of the same year of application and the same
4-digit IPC-class has been selected from the universe of all German patents filed. A probit analysis tests
how the sample probability of litigation for a single patent depends on the value of the patent and the
characteristics of the patentees. Variables correlated with the value of the patent, such as the number of
citations made and received, the size of the patent family, the number of claims, and the path of seeking
patent protection within the German and European market were included. Control variables such as
earlier opposition procedures and the path of seeking protection were included. The results strongly
support the hypotheses that the expected patent value has a positive and significant impact on the
probability of litigation. Patents which survived an opposition procedure have a higher probability of
being litigated while the path of seeking protections has no significant effect. Individuals face a smaller
probability of being involved in patent suits while small firms have the highest risk of litigation. Those
firms have relatively high stakes involved and may show a self serving bias which leads to higher expected
probabilities of winning the case than the potential defendant.
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1 Introduction
The original function of intellectual property rights (IPR) was to provide an instrument to ensure inventors
the ability to recoup the investment made in research. However, awareness of the importance of this
original function has declined during the last 20 years. Other ways of appropriation such as secrecy and
first mover advantage are often much more successful in exploiting innovation.1 Furthermore, inventions
are increasingly produced on a mass scale to build up a knowledge stock, which is necessary in some
technological areas to keep up with technological progress in cumulative technologies.2 As a result, the
number of patent applications and grants has risen during these years. In rapidly changing areas of
technology, patenting behavior has a signaling character showing the direction of new development. More
strategic functions of patents are widely recognized, such as signaling market potential in assigned fields
of technology, safeguarding former patents by enhancing inventions, or building a patent stock that can
be used as a bargaining chip in negotiations on new technologies and mergers. Additionally, licensing and
cross licensing have evolved into a large–scale profit source for innovative firms with capacity constraints
or a need for complementary technology. Patents have become strategic weapons, and the enforcement
of IPR has become a strategic means in technological competition.
This paper analyzes the characteristics of patent infringement suits in Germany. This is economically
interesting because patent infringement suits are a costly way of enforcing intellectual property rights.
Patenting itself is a costly process, and enforcing a granted property right against infringement is likewise
associated with costs, namely time and expenditure of the legal process. In addition, the uncertainty
during the dispute is linked with opportunity cost. In some cases opposition procedures, challenge or
nullity suits are filed against granted patents. These procedures and suits are part of the enforcement.
A potential litigation suit before a district court is the last and most costly alternative to enforce a
patent right. In all of these disputes, there is always a possibility of settlement. That means a license or
cross–license agreement could be found to the satisfaction of both parties. If patenting has a strategic
character, then enforcement of patent rights includes strategic elements as well. Enforcement of IPR
includes a successful application and granting procedure at the patent office. The most crucial argument
in favor of the decision to file a suit is the expected value of the dispute. This value depends mainly on
the value of the patented innovation but also on the characteristics of the parties and technological and
economic conditions involved.
The estimated litigation rate in Germany is about 1 percent of all patents in force at any given time. This
figure seems quite low. However, large differences between various fields of technology can be observed.
It is expected that the probability of litigation will be higher for more valuable patents (Lanjouw und
Schankerman 2003, Harhoff und Reitzig 2004). The distribution of the value of patents is highly skewed,
meaning that most patents have little value.3 Accordingly, the number of litigation cases is low, compared
to the total number of patents in force. However, the rate of litigation remained constant even with growing
numbers of application and grants.4 The analysis of the German system is of special interest because,
compared to the U.S. system it works with relatively low costs and it seems to be the fairest system from
an offensive and defensive perspective (Blackburn 2000).
After an IPR infringement is detected, the patentee may decide to negotiate the issue with the infringer.
Using a game theoretic approach it is clear that with symmetric and complete information the parties
should always come to a settlement solution (Bebchuk (1984), Meurer (1989)). This result would minimize
the cost of the dispute, maximize the profits from the invention and optimize the compensation for both
parties with respect to welfare. If this is optimal, the question may arise why at least one patent or
utility suit is nevertheless filed per day in Germany. One explanation for this failure of settlement in
infringement disputes could be that the parties form different expectations about the payoffs and about
their probability to prevail at trial, even though they have access to the same information.
1See Cohen et al. (2000) for survey evidence.
2See e.g. Hall und Ziedonis (2001).
3See Harhoff et al. (2003b) for an analysis of the patent value distribution at their high value end.
4I calculated this rate by comparing the numbers in Stauder (1989) with the data I collected for the district courts in
Mannheim and Duesseldorf.
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This paper is the first empirical analysis of the determinants of patent and utility litigation in Germany.
A new and unique data set of 715 IPR cases gives new insight into the course and outcome of litigation
disputes. The data include all cases filed at two of the three main district courts in Germany during
the period from 1993 to 1995.5 These patent and utility suits covered 910 IPRs in litigation. The data
were combined with patent information from the German Patent Office (DPMA) and the European
Patent Office (EPO), both located in Munich. Furthermore, a control group of 850 German patents
randomly drawn from the population of all patents has ensured a comparable investigation and provided
the possibility to develop a system of determinants of IPR litigation in Germany.
Within a probit estimation I analyze the probability of litigation as a function of a set of exogenous
variables which reflect characteristics of the patent, market conditions, and characteristics of the patent
owner. As expected, I observe a higher probability of litigation for patents which are more valuable than
average. This is significant for all patent characteristics which were proved to be correlated with the value
of the patent (Harhoff et al. 2003). Another telling result is the significantly higher probability of small
firms being involved in a patent litigation suit, which points to the relatively high value patents have for
the small companies compare to larger ones. This conclusion has a substantial impact on the conditions
of insurance contracts against the risk of patent litigation.
This paper is organized as follows: In section 2 I outline the German litigation procedure. In section
3 I sketch a model of the decision to litigate and derive hypotheses about the determinants of patent
litigation. Section 4 contains a description of the database and the control group formation process.
Empirical results for Germany are presented in section 5. In conclusion, in section 6 I discuss the results
obtained.
2 The German System of Patent Litigation
A patent can be subject to litigation before a German district court if it is valid in Germany. The original
application may have been filed at the German Patent Office, as a Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)
patent or at the European Patent Office, with Germany as the designated state in the latter cases. Before
1976 patent protection for Germany was only available at the DPMA. It received all applications; its
examiners conducted search and examination. On average, 61% of the applications resulted in a German
patent grant.6 The requirements for patentability of an invention are novelty, inventive activity, and
commercial applicability (§ 1, German Patent Act). “Novel” is that which is not state of the prior art.
An invention is the result of inventive activity if the activity is not obvious to an expert on the state
of the prior art (§§ 3 and 4, German Patent Act).7 If the examination of a patent application reveals
novelty, inventive activity and commercial applicability and the formal requirements of the application
are fulfilled, the patent right will be granted.
In 1978 the PCT entered into force.8 A PCT application allows an applicant to file one international
application (“international phase”) in a process to seek patent protection in multiple contracting states
named in the application (“National Phase”). A PCT application can be filed up to twelve months after
the priority date and is submitted to the relevant national patent office or to the European office (Art.
5There are special chambers at district courts which are exclusively responsible for dealing with IPR suits. They are
distributed throughout a region in order to give all potential plaintiffs the chance to file a suit in the vicinity of the infringer.
6This calculation is based on the application and granting information contained in the PATDPA database described in
section 4.2. There is a large variation among the years. Patent applications submitted in the late 1980s to the mid-1990s
had an average granting probability of more than 70 percent, starting at 41 percent in 1978 and increasing to 71 percent in
1988. From 1995 to 1999 the granting rate decreased to 48 percent, which was partly caused by the grant lag of about 3.2
years.
7In Germany, it is possible to apply for a petty patent or utility patent. These patents have lower requirements for
the inventive step (§ 1, Utility Patent Act). In contrast to the inventive activity necessary for a regular patent grant, the
inventive step for an utility patent requires a less detailed examination. However, in terms of enforcement the same rules
apply as to the regular patents.
8The PCT is a multilateral treaty that was concluded in Washington in 1970. It is administered by the International
Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), whose headquarters are in Geneva (Switzerland). As of
the beginning of 2004, 123 contracting states provide the possibility of applying for a PCT patent.
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10 PCT). Art. 15 PCT specifies how the first international search is to be conducted. The advantages
of PCT applications are that the applicant files one application – the international application – in one
place and in one language, paying one initial set of fees; this international application also has the effect
of a national or regional application. Without the PCT, the applicant would have to file separately for
each country. In addition, at the beginning of a patent’s life – the “international phase” – its applicant
does not face all of the translation costs and application fees at once. They are due when the application
enters its respective “national phase”.9
At the same time, in 1978, the European Patent Organization started to work actively with the European
Patent Office (EPO) in Munich.10 The European procedure for patent application, examination, and
granting is very similar to that of Germany. At the applicant’s formal request, an examination concerning
the novelty and inventive step determines whether the prerequisites for patentability are fulfilled (Art 92,
European Patent Convention, EPC). The examination report is a formal statement of the legal executive
authority and serves as the basis for the granting decision. A European application names the member
states in which patent protection is sought. In those designated states, a European patent grant becomes
a national right.
Both the European and German patent systems provide the opportunity to oppose a patent grant,
although the post–granting time frames differ. These requests are decided upon by specialized opposition
boards at the patent offices (Art. 99, European Patent Act; § 59, German Patent Act).11 In Germany,
invalidity suits as well as appeals against decisions on opposition are heard at the Federal Patent Court
in Munich (§ 81, German Patent Act).
Annulment suits are also part of the patent system. According to § 82, German Patent Act, an annulment
suit has to be filed at the the Federal Patent Court. European patent grants for Germany become regular
German patent rights. Because of this, annulment suits against these grants must be filed at the German
Federal Patent Court. For patents valid for the German market, issues of infringement and license disputes
are left to the specialized district courts of civil law. These issues are completely separate from questions
of patent validity. If property rights are in force, they are civil rights and civil law therefore applies in
cases of their infringement. Enforcement procedures such as infringement or license disputes must be
brought before the relevant district court of first instance. Patents are presumed to be valid by the judges
involved. As von Meibom und Pitz (1996) point out, the German district courts have “no power to revoke
the patent or to alter the claims of the patent.” The jurisdictional responsibility for patent infringement
cases is given to 13 district courts in Germany. More than 80% of all cases in Germany are covered by
the district courts in Du¨sseldorf, Munich, and Mannheim. Hamburg, Frankfurt and Braunschweig can
be considered experienced courts as well even though a fairly low number of cases are filed there. The
plaintiff can almost arbitrarily choose the location for filing the suit. He or she can sue either at the
infringer’s domestic location of business or in the jurisdictional area where the infringement took place.
Therefore, a potential plaintiff will search for a forum where he or she expects the highest benefit in
terms of damages but also in terms of winning probability. This “forum shopping” is also be influenced
by differences in technical qualification and experience of judges at various district courts.
The course of patent infringement suits is determined by the German Code of Civil Procedure. Neverthe-
less, this can differ from one district court to the next with respect to the time table of actions, another
reason for forum shopping. An IPR case starts when the plaintiff issues a statement of claim including
the names of the parties, the details of the infringing action, and the particulars of the property right in
question. It also specifies the remedy requested, including all costs and damages. The court serves the
statement of claim to the defendant, who then has the chance to respond to the allegation. A common
means of defense is to present a nullity claim or an opposition which is often combined with a request to
postpone the litigation procedure.12 The court forms expectations regarding the outcome of these means
9See Thumm for a comprehensive description of IPR systems.
10The European Patent Office grants European patents for the contracting states to the European Patent Convention,
which was signed in Munich on 5 October 1973 and entered into force on 7 October 1977.
11An opposition against a granted German patent must be filed within three months of the grant’s announcement (§ 59
German Patent Act). For a European patent, third–party opposition is possible up to nine months after the patent grant
is published (Art. 99, European Patent Convention).
12Case evidence shows that in around 50 percent of the cases, an opposition or a nullity suit had been filed as a means
of defense. See von Meibom und Pitz (1996) for further procedural details.
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of defense and decide whether the legal procedure should be postponed until the Federal Patent Court
or the DPMA has decided on the validity of the patent. Evidence is derived mainly from documents,
witnesses, and independent experts. The parties are legally bound to deliver all relevant information;
there is, however no discovery. The plaintiff in particular is required to exercise due diligence in fully
investigating the potential infringement. If the parties are unable to come to a settlement agreement,
the judge orders an oral hearing and renders a judgement. The judgement is either condemnation or
partial condemnation of the defendant according to the plaintiff’s requests or a dismissal of the lawsuit.
In case of condemnation, the remedies can be injunction, accounting for unlawful profits, or damages. In
those cases, the infringer is obliged to stop the infringing action, provide all necessary information for
calculation of the damages and eventually pay them.13
In cases of urgency and risk of high and irreparable losses, the patentee may apply for a preliminary
injunction (§§ 934 and 940, German Code of Civil Procedure). This must be done promptly after the
infringement has been detected.14 Moreover, the patentee must issue a clear statement that this urgent
injunction would prevent him or her from suffering large losses. If the injunction is granted, the infringer
will be enjoined from continuing his or her infringing activities (§ 139 German Patent Act).15
Two types of expenses are relevant in most cases: court costs and attorney costs. Both are strongly related
to the jurisdictional value of the case, which is set by the court after the letter of claims is filed. The
court estimates the jurisdictional value considering the value of the invention and the size of the parties
involved.16. The judge takes into account a fairly rough estimate of the patent holder’s recorded sales with
the patented invention. Both court costs and recoverable attorney expenses depend on the jurisdictional
value based on a fee schedule. According to the applicable British rule, the losing party must pay all
of the winning party’s court costs, recoverable attorney costs, and expenses for expertise of the winning
party, as well as its own expenses.
3 Aspects of decisions on infringement, litigation and settle-
ment
3.1 Theoretical framework
Theoretical work on the determinants of patent litigation indicates that the sample of litigation cases is
not a random selection of all possible suits (Priest und Klein 1984, Bebchuk 1984, Katz 1987). Following
the argumentation in the selection model of Priest und Klein (1984), all determinants of settlement and
litigation are purely economic. Their model indicates that parties will settle when their expectations
regarding the quality of the dispute and their involved stakes are similar.17 Furthermore, the litigation
rate will increase (and the settlement rate will decrease) when the cost of settlement is high relative to
the litigation cost. The authors assume that the expectations the parties have of the outcome and their
actual gains from the litigation suit diverge while the information on the stakes and the probability of
winning is distributed symmetrically. These data include the expected costs of the court decisions, the
information that parties possess on the likelihood of success, the reputation gains or losses and the direct
costs of a trial. Katz (1987) also observed that the demand of litigation is determined by the relation of
the gains of a dispute relative to its cost.
Subsequent models allow for different information allocations and distributions of knowledge among
the parties and assume asymmetric and/or incomplete information. For example, Meurer (1989) draws
13Usually, judges declare all remedies. But it can be that only condemnation is declared, or damages without accounting
have to be paid.
14Urgency is assumed by the courts only if plaintiff files for preliminary injunction without undue delay after obtaining
knowledge of an infringement. The undue delay is subject to interpretation. The Munich I district court considers longer
than four weeks undue, and all other patent district courts consider more than six months. See Pitz (1999) and Marshall
(2000)for more details.
15See Ko¨rner (1984).
16See Stauder (1989), p. 62.
17This is be the case when the true value of the dispute lies far from the decision standard of the court, whether in favor
of the plaintiff or the defendant.
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conclusions about litigation and settlement decisions in different information situations and different
allocation rules. Bebchuk (1984) developed a model based on the theory that parties make decisions with
incomplete and asymmetric information. Waldfogel (1998) clearly differentiates between the two main
underlying types of litigation models, asymmetric information and diverging expectation. Spier (1994)
extends the analysis toward a sequential game with asymmetric information.18 However, the approach of
Priest und Klein (1984) has become the standard model in economic literature on patent infringement
and challenge cases, since information in IP suits flows through documents and electronic files relatively
easily and is associated with low costs. Therefore, symmetric information is a reasonable assumption in
this case. Moreover, the practice of law is very internationalized and thus not so great advantages for
domestically owned firms over parties from abroad concerning information arise. Most of the empirical
research on the enforcement of property rights and the determinants of patent litigation base their results
on the same assumptions to model the conditions under which litigation cases will be brought to trial
(Lanjouw und Schankerman 2001, 2003, Lanjouw und Lerner 2001, Lanjouw und Lerner 1998, Ziedonis
2003, Somaya 2003). The same basic idea was also applied by Harhoff und Reitzig (2004) to a model of
opposition against pharmaceutical and biotechnology patents at the EPO.
One drawback of the models above is that they start their analysis after the suit has already been
filed. This approach disregards the decision of the potential infringer to enter the market with potential
imitation as well as the decision of the patentee to file suit against a detected infringer. The problem with
analyzing a selection of patent suits is that it is not possible to observe the population of all infringed
patents in reference to the potential base of all possible suits. Investigations of litigation always lack
observation of the infringement rate. To the best of my knowledge, neither in theoretical literature nor
in empirical investigations this problem has been solved.19 All results regarding the probability of patent
litigation are actually statements about the (conditional) probability of a litigation suit given that the
patent has been infringed. 20
The general paths of enforcing a property right are shown in figure 1 according to the legal rules outlined
in section 2. First, a potential infringement of a property right occurs and the patentee considers a possible
reaction. The patentee has the choice between two alternatives. The first is to make a settlement offer in
order to reach an agreement out of court. This offer usually contains a license agreement. If it is accepted
the matter is settled Second, the patentee can file a statement of claims in order to start a legal action.
A legal action can be a regular suit or a request for preliminary injunction.21 Modelling the decision to
file a suit I do not distinguish between filing an ordinary suit and a preliminary injunction because in the
German system it is expected to file an ordinary suit in order to reach a final solution after the injunction
has been granted.
In the following I analyze the decision problem of the parties in a framework presented by Priest und
Klein (1984). The patentee and the infringer decide on whether to litigate or to settle. I assume complete
18Unfortunately, the data available for this study do not allow the derivation statements about the distribution of infor-
mation.
19Lanjouw und Schankerman (2003) mention this problem in their study and argue: “If a patent dispute is settled before
a suit is filed, we do not observe the dispute in the data. Thus low filing rates can either reflect low rates of infringement
or high probability of pre-suit settlement.”(p.149).
20Crampes und Langinier (2002) consider a two-stage game involving the decisions of the potential entrant to infringe
and of the patentee to sue explicitly. From their model they derive predictions about rate of infringement (in the sense
of market entry). Frequency of infringing entry is negatively correlated with the amount of the penalty for infringement
and usually also with settlement cost, efficiency of legal procedures, and probability of infringement identification. Within
their framework, the bargaining power of the patent holder has no unambiguous impact on the frequency of entry. The
predictions of Crampes und Langinier are in the line with earlier results of theoretical literature on litigation and settlement
(Perloff und Rubinfeld 1987, Ordover und Rubinstein 1986, P’ng 1983, Cooter und Rubinfeld 1989.)
21Lanjouw und Lerner (2001) apply the request of a preliminary injunction as a second, separate way to start an action
before court. The injunction process can have a substantial impact on the payoffs. The patentee has to make clear that
in order for he or she to avoid considerable harm a fast decision is necessary. Additionally, he or she has to make the
claims clear. Both are very costly in terms of attorney expenses. For a defendant (or the potential infringer) the preliminary
injunction imposes a significant danger because it can nullify all or a large part of his or her business (Lanjouw und Lerner
2001)
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Abbildung 1: Structure of a Patent Infringement Dispute
Potential Infringement
Settlement Legal Dispute= Litigation
Trial PreliminaryInjunction
and symmetric information on all facts necessary to form expectations of the probabilities of granting and
winning as well as the payoffs and costs of the dispute.22 However, due to idiosyncracies parties do not
necessarily expect the same winning probability or similar values. Parties will go to trial if their expected
return net of legal costs is equal or larger than the expected outcome of a settlement. Thresholds of the
patentee and the litigant have the following form:
ppl [V + D(V )] + (1− ppl)
[
δ
2
V − C(V )
]
≥ (1 + α)δ
2
V Patentee (1)
−pi[D(V ) + C(V )] + (1− pi)
[
δ
2
V + C(V )
]
≥ (1− α)δ
2
V Litigant (2)
Parties form expectations regarding the probability that the plaintiff (patentee) will prevail. Therefore,
ppl and pi are expected probabilities of the plaintiff and the infringer, respectively. In the case where the
patentee prevails, he or she earns V and is paid damages D(V ).23 V is the profit the patentee exoects
to gain by exploiting the patent alone (i.e., without infringement or license agreement). With probability
1−p the court votes against the patentee and he or she has to pay both his or her own legal expenses and
those of the prevailing defendant.24 In this case, more than one company uses the patented innovation
and δ reflects the extent to which the respected industry profit is lowered.
The right hand sides of (1) and (2) show the settlement value for the patentee and the infringer, respec-
tively. In order to avoid an infringement suit the plaintiff allowed the competitor the use the patented
innovation and received royalty payments for the production of the patented innovation. A license agree-
ment will enhance the profit for the patentee by the license fee α on which the parties agreed. Such a
license agreement may include price and output restrictions for the competitor, and it may also define the
explicit license fees to be paid to the patentee.25 The parameter α is the share of profit the competitor has
to give up to the patentee and (1−α) δ2V the settlement payoff of the potential infringer.26 V is a function
22I cannot completely exclude the possibility of asymmetric information on all matters pertaining to the litigation process
and its outcome, such as strength of the patent right and extent of the patent protection which will be elucidated by the
judges during the trial. Different knowledge about the applicability of the patented innovation and market conditions can
also affect the decision to litigate. But the information about the technical details of the patent, the main economic facts
about the litigants and the understanding of the jurisdictional system are available to all parties.
23There are three main methods of calculating damages, all of which depend on the value the patent creates on the market
(Reitzig et al. 2003). Additionally, the time length of infringement and the time left on the patent is enclosed within the
expectations the parties make.
24According to the British rule of cost allocation the losing party has to bear all legal costs. However, in jurisdictional
practice not all attorney expenses are taxable.
25I assume that there is no strong antitrust regime.
26It is also possible that the patentee will not proceed to trial even if the potential infringer rejects a settlement offer.
The license fee in this case is zero.
6
of the characteristics of the patent xp, the characteristics of the firm, xpl and xi, V = V (xp, xpl, xi). There
exist two types of legal costs. The first type are court costs c which do not depend on the patentee’s op-
portunities on the financial market or on his efforts in the case. The second type is the attorney cost and
depends heavily on the efforts one party undertakes in the suit and on the financial conditions it faces on
the market in funding these activities. By law, all legal costs must be proportional to the size of the case
by a factor smaller than one. The size of the case is the loss the patentee is expected to suffer when the
potential infringer uses the invention without permission during the time of dispute and is calculated as
difference between the possible monopoly profit and the patentee’s fraction of the non-settlement profit,
(V − 12δV ).
3.2 Hypotheses on the Determinants of Patent Litigation
From (1) and (2) it is to be seen that the probability of patent litigation depends on the profit V the
parties expect to earn by using the patented innovation. I consider the profit V in the model as a close
correlate to the value of the patent which is a wider concept including the strategic capacity as well as
the signaling and blocking power of the patent. Thresholds (1) and (2) reveal clearly a positive impact
of the value of a patent on the incentives to enforce it (Lanjouw und Schankerman 2001, 2003). With
increasing value of the patent for both the patentee and the infringer the direct incentive to proceed to
trial rather than settle increases.
A growing value also raises the probability of an infringement, which leads implicitly to a higher probabi-
lity of litigation. As mentioned before, the probability of infringement is not observable; the only evidence,
offered by Harhoff und Reitzig (2004) shows that the probability of opposition as an early type of attack
against a granted patent increases with the value of the patent. In the following I derive hypotheses
on how these characteristics influence the probability of a patent litigation suit. The expected winning
probabilities ppl and pi also depend on the characteristics of patentees and the information available to
them.
Characteristics of the patent
The impact the characteristics of patent have on the probability of litigation is mainly due to their
correlation with the value of the patent. Patents are heterogenous and supply different levels of additional
profit to companies through the original protection function and strategic functions (Somaya 2003). The
value a single patent has for its patentee is not observable. The impact that patent portfolios or patent
stocks have on firm value, profits, and sales is hard to identify from survey data (Harhoff et al..
The patent applicant suggests patents which should be included as references to the prior art. However,
the examiner (either of the EPO or the DPMA) makes the ultimate decision on what patents will be
included as backward citations. In contrast, for a U.S. application the applicant is requested to name all
references to the state of the art using patent or non-patent literature, which leads to more citations and to
quoting publications which are only tenuously linked to the applied invention. Michel und Bettels (2001)
emphasize that US citations appear to be more a documentary search than a patentability search. The
references to earlier patents in the German and European system mark the boundaries of patentability
and the bases the invention builds on. They are used to substantiate the patentability for which novelty
and inventive activity is necessary. This function of citations implies that the number of citations received
(forward citations) play a similar role to that of references in scientific publications as an indicator for the
importance of the patent. Traijtenberg (1990) supported this argumentation considerably and Harhoff
et al. (2003a) provided more broad evidence of the correlation between patent value and citations received
in subsequent patent applications. Using the information the citing patents provide, citations can be used
as ingredients in the construction of measures for “originality” and “generality” (Hall et al. 2001). Even
though the forward citation can point to further development and depreciation of the former invention,
the value enhancing effect should be dominant.
H1: Patents which received a large number of forward citations in subsequent patent applications have
ceteris paribus (c.p.) a higher probability of litigation than less cited patents.
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References made to prior patents in both the EPO and DPMA patent applications reflect the state of the
art – the scope. On the one hand, they indicate previously granted patents that pose a potential threat
because they are similar to the invention named in the patent application under consideration and may
restrict it. On the other hand, scope is confirmed to be significantly positive correlated with the monetary
value of German patents (Harhoff et al. 2003). These two functions of citations are not distinguishable
and have a positive effect on the probability of litigation. Lanjouw und Schankerman (2003) argue that
a large number of references in the patent application indicates a well-developed technology with less
uncertainty than newly developed technologies, making litigation less likely. This effect depends highly
on the specific tendnecy of the U.S. system to cite as much as possible. Harhoff und Reitzig (2004) find the
total number of backward citations in EPO applications to have no significant effect on the probability
of opposition. The U.S.–based study of Lanjouw und Schankerman (2001) reports no significant effect of
backward citations per claim, whereas using an updated data set they show a negative effect(Lanjouw
und Schankerman 2003).
H2: The effect of backward citation on the probability of litigation is, ex ante, not clear. It depends
on the relative strength of the value enhancement and restricting effects of backward citation with
respect to the diminishment of uncertainty.
A patentee can file patent applications for the same subject matter in more than one jurisdiction, building
a patent family. Within the one year of priority he or she can file exactly the same patent at certain
patent offices while still fulfilling the requirement of novelty. Putnam (1996) first introduced the number
of such jurisdictions representing family size as a value correlate of patents because it is associated with
considerable costs of application and translation. It is a suitabke variable because it reflects the patent
holder’s private estimation of the patent’s value.
H3: The number of different jurisdictions patent protection is sought in (family size) is, c.p., positively
correlated with the probability of litigation.
A patent claim defines in words the boundaries of an invention so that the public will know what the
invention is and can avoid infringing it. A patent usually comprises a bundle of independent principle
claims which define the basic elements of the invention. Additional subordinate claims describe the
invention in more detail. For the value of the patent the principle claims have a higher relevance than
the subordinate claims. For broad patents indicated by a high number of total claims, an infringement
is more likely. Since probability of litigation is conditioned on the probability of being infringed, c.p.,
probability of litigation depends on number of claims. Positive relationships between number of claims
and probability of a patent being subject to a dispute are found in Lanjouw und Schankerman (2003),
Graham et al. (2003), and Harhoff und Reitzig (2004).
H4: The number of claims has c.p. a positive impact on the probability of patent litigation.
As I explained in section 2 there are three different ways of seeking protection in more than one country.
First, a patentee can apply in each country at its domestic patent office. Second, the European Patent
Office can provide protection within any or all of the member states of the European Patent Convention
via just one application. Applying per PCT application is the third way. It offers patent protection in all
member states of the PCT. In a study by Thumm (2000) the “road of application” is used to indicate
the importance an invention has for the inventor or applicant. PCT applications are similar to EPO
patents; they seek protection in more then one jurisdiction within the member states. I assume that
facing the higher cost of a PCT or EPO application compared to a DPMA application the applicant
expects compensation through higher profits and this values the patent more highly.
H5: Patents which are applied for through the international path via PCT have, c.p., a higher probability
of being litigated than patents applied at the EPO or at the German patent office. The application
path via EPO leads to a higher probability of litigation than that of the German patent office.
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Patents issued by the EPO or the DPMA can be subject to opposition. Any third party can file such
a procedure, claiming that the invention is not new or the inventive step is not signigficant enough. An
opposition is an official act at the patent office that seeks to declare a patent invalid or to amend it.27
If the potentially infringing party is opposing the patent before the suit begins it seems likely that this
party has an interest in using the invention itself and not in leaving the right to the patentee. One reason
for such an interest could be that the opposing (and potentially infringing) party has made a similar
invention. Another reason might be that the expected value of the protected invention is so high that it is
worth opposing and later infringing in order to appropriate at least some of the payoffs of the protected
innovation. Harhoff et al. (2003a) found that a patents which have defeated an opposition procedure
are significantly more valuable than those patents which have not been not attacked. This finding was
strengthened by the analysis of Harhoff und Reitzig (2004), which shows that opposed EPO patents in
biotechnology and pharmaceuticals are generally more valuable, than those which were not opposed when
measured by several value indicators. On the one hand a higher expected value of a patent attracts more
exploitive interests and leads to a higher probability of legal dispute. On the other hand, a patent which
has faced opposition becomes more valuable because it indicates a stronger patent right; this will increase
the plaintiff’s expectations about the probability of winning the case, ppl. I expect that both effects lead
to a positive impact on the probability of litigation (Graham et al. 2003).
H6: Patents which faced an opposition procedure after granting are c.p. more likely to be involved in a
subsequent litigation procedure.
Characteristics of the patentee
Main findings for the U.S. show that the size of the patentee (Lanjouw und Schankerman 2003, Harhoff und
Reitzig 2004) and the relative size of the parties (Somaya, 2003) matters considerably to the probability
of being involved in a patent dispute. Large firms are generally less likely to be involved in litigation
suits than smaller ones. A reason might be that large firms estimate the value of an invention differently
in relation to and their overall profits. In most empirical studies, size is measured by technological size
(number of previous patents granted to the patentee). As indicators for the absolute size served mainly
dummies for listed and unlisted companies and dummies for individuals. Accounting figures such as
turnover or number of employees are rarely available (Lanjouw und Schankerman 2003, Harhoff und
Reitzig 2004, Graham und Somaya 2004). It is generally assumed that economically large firms tend to
have more patents than small firms. A financially strong firm has a higher potential to threaten a suit
being better equipped to reconcile all included costs over a longer period of time.
H7: Large firms face, c.p., a smaller probability of patent litigation than small ones.
Companies with a large portfolio of previous patents are more experienced in enforcing their rights.
Additionally, firms with a large portfolio of similar patents have more opportunities to keep α small
and to offer cross licensing agreements for settlement. The argument that repeated interaction of firms
with large patent portfolios leads to a higher threat point in settlement bargaining is made by Lanjouw
und Schankerman (2003). However, this is of importance only in case when the financial markets are
incomplete. Companies with a large portfolio of patents which are probably related to the patent in
question are likely to be involved in more potential infringement and litigation disputes as well as more
license bargaining. It is not clear whether the experience in bargaining, the reputation gained through
prior disputes, or the high expected costs of repeated disputes lead to smaller probability of litigation for
these companies.
H8: Firms with a large number of previously granted patents (a large patent portfolio) are, c.p., less
likely to be involved in patent litigation suits. The effect diminishes in proportion to an increasing
portfolio size. I expect an U-shaped relationship
27See Harhoff und Reitzig (2004) and for a detailed description of the opposition procedure.
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Because of individual patentee’s tendnecy to be personally involved in the enforcement of “their patent”,
I expect a bias towards more litigation suits when these patent owners are involved. Individuals tend to be
more optimistic in evaluating the profits of a patented innovation (Astebro 2003). According to the model
outlined above this would lead to a higher risk of litigation for individuals when compared to companies.
A significantly higher probability of domestic individuals suing potential infringers is also a stable stylized
fact and is displayed in the above cited studies on the U.S. This is partly due to larger relative stakes of
individuals. Individuals patenting software innovations in the U.S. were found by Graham und Somaya
(2004) to be more litigious than companies. Lanjouw und Schankerman (2003) show mixed evidence: for
domestic individuals a positive effect but the opposite for foreign individual patent owners. I also expect
that individuals are more likely to be involved in patent litigation than companies.
H9: Individuals are, c.p., more likely to litigate than companies.
I expect that the origin of the patentee matters due to different costs of aquiring access to information.
The probability of litigation should be higher for Germans, compared to foreign patent owners. Regarding
foreigners, I expect European patentees to be more often involved in patent litigation suits than owners
from non-European countries because of the lower expected costs (Harhoff und Reitzig 2004). Foreign
patentees have per se the same access to information regarding the patented invention. But, the cost
related to translation and to the attorney for the German jurisdictional system are considerable and
lower their propensity to sue at a German district court.
4 Data
4.1 Court data collection
For the empirical analysis of patent litigation cases, I used a database extracted from files in court
archives. In Germany computerized data are not available, neither on litigation in general nor on patent
litigation in particular. All large district courts with specialized chambers for IPR suits28 were asked
for access to their archives. Two of the three most important district courts –Duesseldorf, Mannheim–
agreed to give access to the written case records. Stauder (1989) found that more than 60 percent of
the patent and utility cases are finished within their second year and 95% after six years. Around one
year is necessary for the court of first instance. Since the archives contain only records of finished cases,
I chose the filing years 1993-1995 at the courts. These filing cohorts are likely to catch as many finished
cases as possible and are not too far in the past to match comprehensive information about the parties
with information from other databases.29 Virtually all cases filed during this period of time are included
within the data set. In Mannheim data collection lasted from May 1999 to July 1999. In Du¨sseldorf it
lasted from October 1999 to February 2000.
Even though the chambers at the district courts are specialized, there is a wide range of different legal
arguments treated at those chambers: disputes over general contracts, license suits, and IPR cases in-
cluding patents, utility patents, copyrights, and trademarks. For IPR cases, not only infringement is a
topic of legal disputes, but all kinds of contract issues must be decided on. Therefore, it was necessary
to identify the patent and utility infringement cases among all cases filed at those chambers. For the
purpose of this research, I chose the legal rights of patents and utility patents because they are relatively
strong compared to trademarks and copyrights and they identify technological inventions based on R&D
efforts. The procedures for legal disputes about infringement are very similar for both types of property
right. The subject line on the front page of the files served as the main indicator. I searched for words and
phrases such as “patent,” “patent infringement,” “utility patent,” “injunction,” “preliminary injunction,”
“presentation of accounts,” “license agreement,” and “employee invention.” The first screening revealed
about 950 cases of infringement. A second screening, reading the statement of claim and the defendant’s
28Mannheim, Du¨sseldorf, Munich, Frankfurt
29A cohort contains patents with the same year of application.
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answers, disclosed whether the subject matter was really an infringing action. I kept only clear cases of
patent and utility infringement. For the analysis, I included both requests for preliminary injunction and
regular filings in the investigation. I discarded all suits regarding disputes over license contracts, legal
arguments about compensation of employees’ inventions, and other cases with patents and utility patents
involved but where no infringement took place. After the second screening 715 infringement cases were
left within the sample. By definition of the jurisdictional responsibility, challenge suits are not treated at
the district courts. However, there are suits dealing with license disputes where patent claims and license
contracts are in question, suits dealing with unauthorized warnings against infringers who actually did
not infringe, or suits dealing with advertising with patent rights which are not actually covered by patent
claims. Those types are similar to challenge suits but are heard by the civil court. For this reason I main-
tained those proceedings within the data set. For the third step of the detailed investigation, 715 cases
of pure patent or utility litigation had to be screened meticulously. The correspondence of the parties,
including the statement of claims and the response of the defendant, was checked. This process yielded
information about the requested claims and the arguments of the parties. The court decisions and rulings
revealed the outcome and the costs of the cases.30
The information extracted from the written case files was divided into three main categories: the procee-
dings of the suit, the parties, and the patent at issue. The first category covers a brief description of the
stages of the infringement case. It includes the dates of the filing, the oral hearing, and the ruling. Almost
all case files reported the outcomes, including the outcomes of any first and second appeals. Cost figures
were also collected. Additionally, paid damages were added to the costs. The second category covers the
names and the locations of the parties involved in the trial. At least one party was located within the
jurisdiction of the court. The third category covers information on the patents, such as the age of the
patent at time of filing as well as the field of technology (IPC).
The amount of information about the patents kept in the court records differs between the two courts.
In Mannheim, the records normally include the patent document or the disclosure as well as witnesses’
documents and expert’s reports. At the district court in Du¨sseldorf, only the statement of claim, the
subsequent correspondence between the parties and the court, and the judgement of the court are kept
in the permanent files.
4.2 Public data
In order to complete the information about the patents involved in the disputes, data from the German
Patent Office (DPA) and the European Patent Office (EPO) were added. Information on application dates,
granting dates, IPC classifications, and the applicants and inventors are available from the databases
PATDPA and EPOLINE. PATDPA is the database of the German Patent Office and lists all patent
applications with all information included in the patent document. Additionally, all bibliographic data
such as fee payments, oppositions and their results, changes of the patentee, and the lapsing of the
patent in the public domain are viewable in this file. PATDPA contains around 2.5 million patents and
utility patent. It covers patent data from 1976 until 1998. Beginning from 1978, the electronic form
contains reliable information on patents and utilities. But still the information on the renewal data are
not complete. A similar database, ELPAC, is available at the European Patent office. It includes all
patent applications submitted to the EPO with roughly the same variables, encompassing 1.2 million
patent applications since 1978. The important information about backward and forward citations was
extracted by searching the complete databases.31
As mentioned above, the records of the Regional Court in Mannheim normally include the patent docu-
ments. with information about the patent, such as the name of the applicant, IPC classification, dates
of application, granting, an publishing, and so on. For the Du¨sseldorf records, the statement of claims
contains most of this information, but often the records are incomplete in this regard. A patent number,
30The appendix contains the detailed form I used to record all the information I extracted from the written case files.
31A detailed description of the creation of the citation data file and the correction for truncation following Hall et al.
(2000) is given in Section 4.4.
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either from the EPO or the DPA, was accessible in 95% of the suits. In cases where patent numbers could
be matched, the information was updated by using the PATDPA database or the ELPAC database.32
Since an official business register does not exist for Germany, I added the complementary information for
corporations using the database of the most important German credit rating agency, the Verband der
Vereine fu¨r Creditreform (Creditreform data) in Neuss. Merging these data with the litigation data gives
us a more detailed picture of the corporations involved. Industry codes according to the European NACE
classification were added as well as firm size measured by the number of employees.
4.3 Creation of the control group
For an investigation of the differences between patents litigated and those not, it is necessary to create
a control group of patents. Therefore I have selected an appropriate data set from the population of all
German patents and European granted patents from 1978 to 1995.33 I have stratified the control group
by the year of application and the main IPC classification at the four–digit level. For each patent in
the group of litigated patents, one matched patent was drawn randomly from the universe of German
and European patents. When randomly chosen patents are used as the control group, matched patents
means that those were not subject of a legal litigation suit. There is still a probability that a patent
chosen for the control group was subject to an earlier or later dispute or to a dispute at one of the other
nine district courts. But this probability is fairly small (about one percent) and can be disregarded. I
could not find comprehensive data in the database for patents in the group of litigated patents which
had an application date prior to 1978. To ensure a one–to–one match, I excluded those patents from
the investigation group. Finally, the sample of litigated patents contains 824 patents with application
dates from 1978 to 1993. Finally, the reference group of non-litigated patents consists of 824 patents. All
relevant variables including citation data and information on patentees and technology fields are included
for these patents.
4.4 Variables
In section 3.2 I introduced the theoretical determinants of probability of litigation. In the following I link
them to a set of independent variables consisting of those which are related to the characteristics of the
patent as an invention, those which describe the patentee, and those which are related to the market
situation and conditions for innovative activity. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the variables I
used in the analysis. The first block contains the patent characteristics. The characteristics of the patent
holder are displayed in the second block.
Patent characteristics
For an analysis of forward citations I searched the patent databases PATDPA (FORW CIT D) and
ELPAC (FORW CIT E) thoroughly and counted the number of subsequent patent applications which
cite the investigated patent as prior invention. I truncated the number of forward citations at the first
filing year 1993. Furthermore, it is not certain that the full number of citations received is documented
in the PATDPA even for the oldest patents with application dates in the early 1970s. To correct for
this truncation bias I used the method of “fixed effects” as described in detail in Hall et al. (2002). The
underlying assumption of this approach is that all differences in the citation intensities over time are due
to artifacts. Citation behavior does not change over time and the number of forward citations per patent
and per cohort is constant. Annual effects are eliminated by dividing the number of forward citations
of a patent by the mean of forward citations of its cohort. I used this weighted forward citation in the
analysis.
32The concomitance of the European and German system and their interdependence is fact to be considered in the variable
definition especially creating citation data.
33Since All European patents granted for Germany are encompassed in PATDPA, I have drawn the matched patents from
the PATDPA solely. Though some additional information came from other data bases such as ELPAC and EPOLINE.
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In the samples of both litigated and unlitigated patents are 438 patents that were originally filed at
the EPO. The other 1,210 were originally applied for at the DPMA. Reliable information on forward
citation was available only at the original patent office. By reason of this lack of data I combined both
sources of information and removed double counts (FORW CIT D+E). Tables 2 and 3 indicate the main
properties of these citation variables. It contains the disentangled means for references made and citations
received at the DPMA (FORW CIT D) and at the EPO (FORW CIT E) as well as the combined figures
(FORW CIT D+E).
First, I observe table 2, column 5 to compare the sample means of the forward citations. On average, an
original European patent in the sample is cited in 1.877 subsequent European patent applications. Sur-
prisingly, this number is significantly smaller than for German subsequent applications. Original German
applications in the sample have on average 2.172 forward citations. One reason might be that patents
valid in Germany are more frequently cited at the DPMA because it is the relevant market. For European
patent citations patents from other EPC member states are more important in respect to the first to
file rule. In all cases litigated patents are more frequently cited than those unlitigated, which is expected
in H1. On average, the number of the combined forward citations is 2.33, while litigated patents had
received 2.8 times more forward citations than unlitigated patents (table 1).34
Now I turn to the number of backward citations, which I display in detail in table 3. A problem similar
to that which presented itself regarding forward citations occurred for this variable as well. For the 1,210
patents originally filed at the DPMA I used citations from the DPMA publication (BACKW CIT D). For
the 438 applications which were made solely at the EPO with designation to Germany I implemented the
backward citations from EPO (BACKW CIT E). While Michel und Bettels (2001) stress the diversity in
citation attitudes among the triad patent jurisdictions (US, EPO, JP), there are also differences between
the EPO and the DPMA. Again, I use both variables parallel (BACKW CIT D+E) because, for original
EPO patents, only the references in the EPO publications documents are available (BACKW CIT E).
While the average of BACKW CIT D is 2.401, the mean of BACKW CIT E is 4.559. The difference is
statistically significant. In general, litigated patents tend to cite more references to prior patents than
unlitigated patents by a factor of 1.5. However this is driven by backward citations of the original German
applications. For patents that were applied for at the European Patent Office, BACKW CIT EPO is not
significantly different between litigated or unlitigated patents .35
For the following variables, information is almost uniquely available both for original German patents
and original European patents and the description is consolidated in table 1. The number of claims was
received directly from the patent documents which can be downloaded from the databases (CLAIMS).
I calculated the number of independent claims. In this study the number of claims is used as a better
measure of patent breadth compared to the number of IPC subclasses a patent can be assigned to. The
number of claims differs between the groups. While 9.6 claims were filed on average across the entire
sample, the patents not involved in litigation had an average of 8.6 claims and the litigated patents 10.5.
Patent data bases usually contain a set of variables which reveal family information. FAMILY SIZE
is defined as the number of jurisdictions in which patent protection was sought. It conforms to the
definition of family size used by Putnam (1996). After removing double counts this variable was directly
obtained from PATDPA to be used in this analysis. At the EPO the variable for family size is not readily
available; the number of designated states includes only states which are members of the European Patent
Organization and does not include jurisdictions such as the U.S. or Japan. The average family size of
litigated patents differs significantly from that of unlitigated patents (5.6 and 4.7).
Patents which were filed via the PCT application path (PCT APPL) are rare within the sample of
litigated patents. The number of PCT application actually remained very small until the end of the 1980s
and grew at the beginning of the 90s. Generally, only 1.7 per cent of patents were sought via PCT in
1980, but this rose to around around 25% by the late 1990s. Because the bulk of the patents in the sample
were applied for between 1982 and 1987 the PCT application plays only a minor role as a way of seeking
34For all variables in table 1 a test of equal means was conducted. Numbers with ∗ indicate significant differences at the
1% level.
35I am grateful to Stefan Wagner from Inno-tec Munich who provided excellent citation information from the EPOLINE
data bases, collected in cooperation with the EPO.
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patent protection. Across the entire sample, protection was sought via PCT application in 4.7% of the
cases and via EPO application in 26.6%. Within the litigated group of patents, the share of PCT APPL
is significantly lower (3.2%). The numbers for original EPO patents (EPO APPL) differs not significantly
between the two groups.
A dummy variable indicates if an opposition procedure had been filed (Opposition) either at the EPO
or at the DPMA. I have not differentiated between the procedures at the German Patent Office and the
EPO, even though national opposition affects the validity of a patent only for the German market, a
European one has effects for all designated states. For a domestic litigation suit only the issue of prior
opposition as such is important.36 Litigated patents were opposed five times more often than patents in
the control group. This ratio is most striking in order of magnitude.
Characterisitcs of the patentee
The dummy variable INDIVIDUAL defines whether the patentee is an individual or a corporation. In
cases where the patentee as potential plaintiff was indicated as corporation, size and industry variables
were added. For the foreign corporations the data were completed by searches using internet and in-
formation from several firm databases.37 Finally four size classes were constructed using sales figures.
The first includes all individuals, the second small firms with sales totaling less than 10 million DM
(SMALL FIRM); the third is for medium sized firms with sales of more than 10 million DM up to 100
million DM (MEDIUM SIZE FIRM); the fourth class includes all large firms with sales of more than
100 million DM (LARGE FIRM).38 While the share of SMALL FIRM for litigated patents is 26.1% ,
2.7 times higher than the 9.6% in the group of unlitigated patents, this difference decreases for ME-
DIUM SIZE FIRM from 33.4% to 26.8%, by factor 1.2). LARGE FIRM are less frequently represented
as patentees in the group of litigated patents than in the unlitigated group (31.3% versus 39.5%). The
relation is 0.8. Individuals are less likely to be owners of a litigated patent. 24.2% of the unlitigated
patents are held by individuals compared to only 9.1% of the litigated patents. Table 1 shows that all of
differences are statistically significant.
I constructed the variable patent portfolio size (PATENT PORTFOLIO) as the number of all patents
of the patentee which were in force at the time the law suit was filed. It is the sum of all applications
granted at the DPMA starting from 1978 to the year of filing. I also used the EPO applications which
were designated for Germany because I intended to interpret the portfolio partly as a means of bargaining
in the German market. The average portfolio size is 1,590. It ranges from 1 to 66,369. As expected, for
foreign firms the portfolio size is smaller with 1,262 on average. Even though the difference between
domestic and foreign applicants is great, it is not statistically significant. Among the litigating parties
foreigners have a larger portfolio than those for Germany.
Additionally, I used the respective owner’s base nation to identify domestic and foreign patentees. The
owners are from the EU, the U.S., Japan, and others (OWNER FOR EU, OWNER FOR US, OW-
NER FOR JP, and OWNER FOR OTHER). The probability of litigation should be higher for Germans,
of course, and also among the foreigners with respect to European patentees because of the lower expected
costs. The share of patent owners who have their headquarters in Germany is almost two-thirds in the
sample. Within the group of litigating parties it increases up to 76.6%. Among the foreign patent holders
the share of European patentees is more than 50 percent. As expected, patentees from the EU are more
likely to be involved in litigation suits than patentees from other foreign countries. U.S. patentees are
represented less often in the group of litigating parties and the shares of Japanese and other owners are
even lower.
36Between European and German patents no significant differences in opposition frequency is observable. The shares of
opposed patents are 16.4 and 15.7, respectively.
37Commercially provided firm databases are Creditreform, MARKUS, AMADEUS, Hoppenstedt, and for the U.S., the
COMPUSTAT file.
38The size classes defined in Euro are approximately: less than 5 mio. Euro, up to 50 mio. Euro, more than 50 mio. Euro.
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5 Empirical results
5.1 Descriptive statistics
For the analysis of the determinants of patent litigation suits in Germany I used a sample of 824 patents
that were applied and granted at the German Patent Office or the European Patent Office and which
were involved in patent litigation at the district court in Du¨sseldorf or Mannheim during the period 1993
to 1995.39 Applications for preliminary injunctions are included within the group of litigated patents.
They are regarded as filed suits as well. The number of applications for a preliminary injunction almost
doubled from 69 in the preiod 1972–1974 to 109 in the period from 1993–1995.40 First, I want to describe
the structure of the litigation sample as it compares to the control group and to general characteristics
of the population of all German patents.
As Lanjouw und Schankerman found for the U.S. the litigation rate varies dramatically among techno-
logies. IPC-codes are used at the DPMA and EPO in the same way to assign inventions to a field of
technology. Each patent will be assigned to one (principle) or more IPC classes, each of which consists
of a 4 digit main class and a 4-5 digit subclass. The principle IPC class is used to categorize the patent
into a technological area (drugs, chemical, mechanical, electronics, others). To be able to compare the
results with the U.S. studies the data were aggregated similar to the area-definition used by Lanjouw
und Schankerman (1997). Table 4 shows how the distribution within the main technological area differs
among the population of all patents within the same cohorts as the sample. It is to be seen that the share
of pharmaceutical patents is roughly the same in the sample as in compared to the universe. However,
patents applied for in chemicals represent half of the share within the sample distribution compared to
the overall patent grants. Imitation of chemical raw material is relatively easy to detect. This should be
true for pharmaceutical patents as well. However, because biotechnology is included here, which was a
relatively new technology in the period of investigation, the share of pharmaceutical patents involved in
disputes is higher than the overall share would suggest. Mechanical patented inventions are the subject
of litigation disputes more often than their share among the universe indicates.
Table 4 shows the differences in the technology structures. The most striking fact is that the share of
litigated patents granted in Mechanics amounts to 52.18% while it is only 37.79% on average in the
German population in comparable application years. It is more complicated to define precisely claims of
a mechanical invention than, for instance, a chemical formula. Thus, infringement is more likely and, more
importantly, the proof of infringement is more difficult to obtain. Parties will have different expectations of
their probability of winning, making settlement less likely. Only 8.13% of the litigated patents are assigned
to Chemicals while this share in the German population is more than twice as high. Imitation of chemical
raw materials is relatively easy to detect and makes outcomes of litigation suits easy to predict which,
in turn, makes settlement more profitable. Again, this should also hold true for pharmaceutical patents.
However, pharmaceuticals are more likely to be involved in litigation suits than chemical patents. Because
this field includes biotechnology, which was a relatively new technology in the period of investigation,
the share of pharmaceutical patents involved in disputes (8.01%) is higher than the overall share (5.83%)
would suggest. Lanjouw und Schankerman (2003) report greater shares in Drugs and Other Health, in
Chemical and Electronics within in the sample of all filed cases in the U.S. for the suit filing cohorts
between 1978 and 1995 in comparison to Germany. Only Mechanical patents have a higher share in
Germany within the sample of litigated patents. The reason lies partly in the differences in patenting
behavior between the two countries. Germany traditionally has a higher percentage of the more traditional
mechanical patents owned by small and medium sized firms. The probability of litigation is c.p. higher
when more patents are in force. Case study evidence from the chemical industry reports that large German
chemical and pharmaceutical companies try to avoid patent litigation by offering credible settlement
amounts and/or cross-licensing agreements.
39Stauder (1996) determined that these two district courts treat about 55 to 60% of all patent litigation cases in Germany.
I assume in this paper that the affinity forfiling suits at certain district courts did not change decisively over time. Likewise,
the reasons for forum shopping did not change from the analysis period of Stauder (1989) 1971 to 1973 to the recent period
from 1993 to 1995.
40See for comparison the data in Stauder (1989).
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Table 5 contains the distribution across age classes. The average age of a litigated patent is 8.3 years.
About one-third of litigated patents are less than 6 years old, and one-third is between 6 and 10 years
old. There is no reliable information on the average age of a patent in the universe of all German patents
in the period from 1993 to 1995. Therefore, these large shares of young litigated patents can be caused
by a general tendency to infringe and subsequent provoke suits at an average age of 8.3 years. However,
it may be that across all technology classes the average age of a patent in force is around this figure, and
age has no impact on the probability to litigate.
As described in section 4.3 the construction of the control group results in a sample litigation rate of 0.5.
Table 6 shows how this litigation rate varies among the groups of ownership and for different citation
figures. German owners are more likely to be involved in litigation than owners from abroad. Sample
probability of litigation decreases as the geographical distance from Germany increases. Looking at the
last column of table 6, “Total” points out that the German patent owners in the sample face a sample
litigation rate of 0.58, while that of all foreigners is below 0.50. Patents with less than 4 forward citations
have sample litigation rates lower than 0.5. While Germans still face a sample probability of 0.48 patentees
from outside the triad are only in 0.15 (Japan) and 0.11 of Disputes. This table confirms the fact that the
litigation rate rises with the number of forward citations, which points to a higher probability of litigation
for more valuable patents. For patents owned by Germans this effect is monotone in the number of citations
while for EU owners and patentees from other countries it is not. Irrespective of the origin of the owner,
in cases where the number of forward citations is higher than nine the sample probability of litigation
is at least 15 percentage points greater than the constructed litigation probability. In table 7 I show the
sample litigation rates for patentees of different absolute size owning patent portfolios of various sizes.
In general large firms have a sample litigation probability which is less than the average, 0.44. However,
if the firm owns a large portfolio with more than 2,000 patents, this probability drops further to 0.20.
Small firms have an high expected probability of litigation. For firms with a small patent portfolio of
ten patents at most, the sample probability of litigation amounts to 0.80. Surprisingly, medium-sized
firms with a large portfolio have a very high observed probability of litigation (0.70), while firms with a
smaller patent portfolio do not significantly deviate from 50 percent. This number is mainly determined
by multiple cases of one company defending various patents.
5.2 Results from probit estimation
In this section I present the results of the probit analysis. I suppose that the probability of litigation, given
that patent infringement has taken place and has been detected, is correlated to the value of the involved
intellectual property right (first block of Table 8) a number of characteristics of the owner of the right,
and market characteristics (second block of Table 8). FORW CIT D+E is positive and highly significant.
It displays that an increasing number of forward citations leads to a higher sample probability of litigation
at a decreasing rate indicated by a negative parameter of FORW CIT D+E SQU. This result confirms
H1 and is in line with the result of Lanjouw und Schankerman (2003), related studies by Graham und
Somaya (2004) for software patents and Harhoff und Reitzig (2004) for determinants of opposition against
pharmaceuticals. Adding one additional citation would raise the litigation probability by 4.5 percentage
points.41
BACKW CIT D+E has a positive impact on the likelihood of litigation processes in Germany. This effect
is estimated precisely and turns out to be robust against sample variation. One additional backward
citation added to the mean would increase the probability of litigation by 4.7 percent points. This effect
is in the same dimension as that observed for forward citations and is highly significant. The impact of
backward citations on the likelihood of patent litigation diminishes as the number of backward citations
increases, a fact illustrated by a negative parameter for BACKW CIT D+E SQU. The result suggests that
a high number of backward citations indicate either that the patent is likely questionable because of its
similarity to a greater number of previous granted patents or that the value of the patent raises, as I argued
41I used citations per claim in a different probit specification. Doing so I assigned more attention to the valuation of a
certain inventive step documented in one claim. The results remained qualitatively the same and were in the magnitude of
those of Lanjouw und Schankerman (2003). But the estimation was not as precise than the one preferred in this paper and
is not reported here.
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in 3.2. According to H2 I found evidence that this effect dominates the impact of lowered uncertainty in
the distinct field of technology. Lanjouw und Schankerman (2003) found a negative effect of backward
citations on the probability of litigation of patents in the U.S. Harhoff und Reitzig (2004) described no
significant effect of the total number of backward citations on the likelihood of opposition at the European
Patent Office for pharmaceuticals but point out that the composition matters considerably.42 The more
claims a patentee has declared the higher the probability of being litigated seems. One claim added to
the mean of CLAIM raises this probability by 0.6 percentage points. This result confirms H4. It is a
small but precisely estimated parameter and is again in line with the similar estimation of Lanjouw und
Schankerman (2003).
Moreover, patents with a large family size prove to be more likely to be involved in infringement suits. The
effect of FAMILY SIZE on the probability of litigation is positive and highly significant. One additional
designated state as new family member would raise the probability of litigation by 0.8 percentage points
for the sample. These results do not allow the rejection of H3. Regarding the impact of family size on
the likelihood of opposition, Harhoff und Reitzig (2004) found a nonlinear effect which is not apparent in
this infringement analysis. As I mentioned before the value correlates are all positively correlated with
the probability of litigation and are in the line with previous research.
Within the second block the parameters of the patentee’s characteristics are displayed. The probability
of an infringement suit falls as the PATENT PORTFOLIO increases as I expected in H8. I also prove
that the effect increses with a growing number of patents in the portfolio. This is consistent with the
results of Lanjouw und Schankerman (2003) and the argument that experience in holding and enforcing
patent rights has a positive effect on the ability to settle. Additionally, as they argue, there are “beneficial”
enforcement spillovers “among patents within a given firm.” The ability to settle is much greater for larger
firms with larger patent portfolios. Adding 100 patents to the mean portfolio size of 1,590 decreases the
sample litigation rate by 2.3 percentage points. Table 9 displays a different specification showing the
effects of patent portfolio size in 5 classes. It is clearly to be seen that the probability of litigation falls
with the number of patents in the portfolio at an increasing rate. This effect is significant for German
patent owner.
In order to test H9 the variables INDIVIDUAL, SMALL FIRM, MEDIUM SIZE FIRM, and LAR-
GE FIRM are used to indicate the absolute size of the patentee as a determinant of patent litigation.
Using INDIVIDUAL as its base category, Table 8 and table 9 show that regardless of their size companies
have a significantly higher probability of patent litigation than individual patentees. This result is stati-
stically significant. It provides no support for H9. One explanation could be that individuals have, in fact,
high stakes in patent litigation relative to their own wealth. However, in relation to potential infringers
and defendants which are likely to be large firms, the stakes are smaller. Thus, potential defendants might
both be large and have a lower probability to be involved in litigation due to their accepting reasonable
settlement offers. However, it does not explain the contrast to the findings for the U.S. Firstly, diffe-
rences in the litigation system between Germany and the U.S. may create different incentives, especially
for individuals. Due to cost rewarding rules and damage calculation individuals in Germany might be
better off with relatively lower settlement amounts compared to U.S. individual patentees which leads
to less litigation. Secondly, individuals on the German market might be more pessimistic because of the
financial burden a litigation case creates and because of the imperfect financial market, which leads to
more settlement and less litigation by individuals involved in those suits. Companies face with growing
company size a smaller probability of litigation. In other words, the litigation is, c.p. in fact most likely
for small firms with turnover less than 10 million DM compared to other patentees. This result confirms
H7 and is in the line with the results of the studies named above. There is no monotonic relationship
and the marginal effect for MEDIUM SIZE FIRM is lower than for large firms. One explanation might
be, that for large firms it may be of strategically advantageous not to settle sometimes in order to signal
a tough enforcement strategy against infringers. After a reputation as an aggressive plaintiff has been
established more profitable settlement agreements can be achieved in subsequent disputes.
42Harhoff und Reitzig (2004) found a significant positive effect of X documents. Because the information on the shares of
X and A is not available for German references, only the pure number of citations was used here. A detailed investigation
as Harhoff und Reitzig (2004) did using X, Y and A citations would reveal more about the questioning or strengthening
properties of backward citations. This is especially important for German applications where such distinctions are not
documented, yet.
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A set of ownership variables in table 8 shows that foreign patent owners as a whole have a lower pro-
pensity to file suit, though foreign owners from the European Union are more likely to sue than U.S. or
Japanese patentees. The parameters of OWNER FOR EU, OWNER FOR US, OWNER FOR JP, and
OWNER FOR OTHER are significant and growing raising with the geographical distance. This is in line
with the more general results of Lanjouw und Schankerman (2003) and confirms my expectations in secti-
on 3.2. The effects are large and robust and show that foreign patentees may expect a lower probability of
winning because of their disadvantage in evaluating the information. This leads to a lower propensity to
litigate (Priest und Klein 1984). I do not find support for an effect of the path of seeking patent protection
neither for PCT APPL nor for EPO APPL. Hypotheses H5 has to be rejected. As I define EPO APPL as
originally filed EPO-application I found no significant difference between patents originally filed as EPO
or German patents concerning likelihood of patent litigation. Since both application paths leads to the
a German intellectual property rights, there is no jurisdictional difference. All possible value diversity is
captured by the value correlates. Regarding the average date of patent application in the sample (1983-
86) this route of seeking patent protection might not play an important role to influence the litigation
probability. Though this indicator is proven to be correlated with the value of patents.
Now I turn to columns 3 and 4 of table 8. Patents that have survived an opposition procedure have a
higher probability of litigation. The specification in columns 3 and 4 reveals that the expected probability
of litigation for a patent in the sample increases by 35.9 percentage points when an opposition has been
filed, compared to patents with the same characteristics that did not face an opposition. Thi proves that
H6 can not be rejected. The effect is considerable and estimated precisely. Besides the parameters of
FORW CIT D+E and Backw CIT D+E decrease the results are fairly robust against this change. This
result elucidates opposition as an indicator of patent value and may partly explain some of the residual
patent value (Harhoff et al. 2003). After withstanding opposition the patentee’s position will be very
strong. The patentee can be fairly confident and can expect a high probability of winning at trial which
leads to more litigation (Priest und Klein 1984). The high magnitude of the coefficient suggests that this
variable not only reflects the higher value of the patent, but, also gives the speciality of the procedure a
higher weight. An explanation might be that an opponent signals that the patent will be subject of future
infringement and subsequent disputes. If the patent is questionable from the beginning of its granted life
and is not revoked after an opposition, an infringing action and a subsequent infringement suit are more
likely for it than for patents that have not been under question through an opposition procedure. The
results of the analysis do not suggest that patents that have successfully withstood challenges are less
likely to produce costs and uncertainty during litigation suits (Graham et al. 2003).
6 Conclusion
In this paper I have presented an empirical analysis of the determinants of patent litigation suits in
Germany. It is the first study of its kind undertaken for Germany. The information about the suits, the
involved patents, and the parties was obtained by searching the written records at the district courts of
Mannheim and Du¨sseldorf between 1993 and 1995. Additionally, searching the patent data bases of the
German and European Patent Offices and in a number of corporate databases completed the data set.
The multivariate probit analysis confirms that highly valuable patents are more often the subject of
infringement suits. It is not possible to observe whether those patents have been infringed more frequently
or whether they are more frequently litigated before court. Using variables which were tested in prior
work as highly correlated with the value of the patent right turned out to have a positive impact on
the probability of litigation. In this way the results confirm those of Lanjouw und Schankerman (2003).
However, value correlates such as many forward citations, large family sizes and a high number of claims
point to a higher risk of being involved in an infringement suit. Suits are less likely if the parties are
able to settle on justifiable costs. Patent owners with a large portfolio of previous patents may have
experience in defending patents and giving them a protecting belt of patents around the potentially
infringed one. Additionally, they can use the large portfolio as bargaining chips in licensing negotiations.
The differences regarding backward citations are possibly due to their different composition. At this point
further research must be conducted to investigate the impact of the characteristics inherent to the U.S.
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and German patent and litigation systems so that the results can be compared. I further conclude, that an
opposition prior to a suit is a signal of potential further potential infringement and subsequent disputes.
I would not expect that an opposition with possibly amending results for the patent claims will reduce
the propensity to litigate.
Characteristics of the patentee, such as his or her ability to interact repeatedly and his experience in
exploiting and enforcing patents, measured by patent portfolio size lead to significantly lower probabilities
of litigation. A credible threat to file a suit, measured in absolute size (sales or employees) of the plaintiff,
has a negative impact on the filing rate within the sample. Evidence was also found that small firms tend
to have a higher risk of getting involved into a suit. At this point it is not clear whether this is due to the
relatively high profits these firms expect from their invention or if there is some kind of self serving bias
(Babcock und Loewenstein 1997). This bias would lead these firms to form their expectations towards
higher rates of winning at trial and higher gains from suits. However the costs of those suits will harm
the small firms more seriously and may probably lead to financial distress. Additionally, the uncertainty
during the course of the case will cause further losses. This will have a decisive impact on insurance rates
regarding litigation risks. A detailed analysis of the course of the cases will lead to more insight. It is
somewhat satisfying that in contrast to the empirical findings for the U.S., the propensity of individuals
to be involved in patent litigation is relatively low compared to companies due to less experience, high
monitoring efforts, and typically weaker financial background. This this is evident in equal measure for
both domestic and foreign individual patentees.
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Tabelle 1: Descriptive statistics of all exogenous variables
All Litigated Matched
Exogenous Variable Mean Mean Mean
(SD) (SD) (SD)
FORW CIT D+E 2.329 3.412∗ 1.246∗
(4.302) (5.378) (2.403)
BACKW CIT D+E 2.981 3.430∗ 2.533∗
(2.733) (2.905) (2.470)
CLAIMS 9.558 10.500∗ 8.617∗
(8.394) (9.621) (6.831)
FAMILY SIZE 5.137 5.576∗ 4.697∗
(5.647) (6.234) (4.956)
OPPOSITION 0.160 0.271∗ 0.050∗
(0.367) (0.445) (0.218)
EPO APPL 0.266 0.260 0.272
(0.442) (0.439) (0.445)
PCT APPL 0.047 0.032∗ 0.062∗
(0.211) (0.175) (0.241)
PATENT PORTFOLIO 0.159 0.074∗ 0.244∗
(0.713) (0.428) (0.905)
INDIVIDUALS 0.166 0.091∗ 0.241∗
(0.372) (0.288) (0.428)
SMALL FIRM 0.178 0.261∗ 0.096∗
(0.383) (0.439) (0.295)
MEDIUM SIZE FIRM 0.302 0.335∗ 0.268∗
(0.459) (0.472) (0.443)
LARGE FIRM 0.354 0.313∗ 0.394∗
(0.478) (0.464) (0.489)
OWNER DE 0.667 0.771∗ 0.564∗
(0.471) (0.421) (0.496)
OWNER FOR EU 0.174 0.146∗ 0.203∗
(0.379) (0.353) (0.402)
OWNER FOR US 0.096 0.065∗ 0.127∗
(0.295) (0.248) (0.334)
OWNER FOR JP 0.047 0.015∗ 0.079∗
(0.211) (0.120) (0.270)
OWNER FOR Other 0.015 0.004∗ 0.027∗
(0.122) (0.060) (0.161)
Number of observation 1648 824 824
Numbers with
∗
differ statistically significant at 1% level.
23
Tabelle 2: Citation in EPO and DPMA by Litigated and Non-Litigated patents
Litigated Non-Litigated All
Mean Obs Mean Obs Sample Mean Obs
(SD) (SD) (SD)
FORW CIT D 3.271 610 1.055 600 2.172 1210
(2.252) (0.087) (0.126)
FORW CIT E 2.766 214 1.027 224 1.877 438
(0.246) (0.110) (0.139)
FORW CIT D+E 3.412 824 1.246 824 2.329 1648
(0.187) (0.084) (4.302)
Forward Citation are available for both offices. Forw Cit D+E is the sum of both after removing double
counts.
Tabelle 3: Citation in EPO and DPMA by Litigated and Non-Litigated patents
Litigated Non-Litigated All
Mean Obs Mean Obs Sample Mean Obs
(SD) (SD) (SD)
BACKW CIT D 2.964 610 1.828 600 2.401 1210
(2.744) (1.974) (2.459)
BACKW CIT E 4.757 214 4.420 224 4.584 438
(2.950) (2.672) (2.813)
BACKW CIT D+E 3.430 824 2.533 824 2.981 1648
(0.101) (0.086) (2.733)
Backward Citation were available only for the original filing patent office. Backw Cit D+E is the combination
of either Backw Cit DPMA or Backw Cit EPO.
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Tabelle 4: Distribution of Patents among Technological Areas, by litigated and unlitigated patents
Frequency and Shares of Patents in Main Technological Areas
Area of technology German population Sample of Litigated Patents
Pharmaceutical 112,396 5.83% 66 8.01%
Chemical 330,999 17.18% 67 8.13%
Electronic 549,965 28.54% 123 14.93%
Mechanical 708,983 36.79% 430 52.18%
Other 224,598 11.66% 138 16.75%
Total 1,926,941 100.00% 824 100.00%
Note: Patents for German population reported in PATDPA with application date from 1978 to 1993
Tabelle 5: Age of Patents at Time of Filing in the Sample of Litigated Patents
Patent’s Age
(years from application date) Number of patents percent
0 to 5 255 30.95%
6 to 10 300 36.41%
11 to 15 216 26.21%
16 to 20 53 6.43%
no. of firms 824 100.00%
Note: The average age at the time of filing is 8.3 years
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Tabelle 6: Sample Probability of Litigation by Ownership and Forward Citations
Forward Citation
Owner from 0 1 – 3 4 – 7 7 – 9 more than 9 Total Obs
Germany 0.48 0.57 0.74 0.78 0.88 0.58 1100
(0.50) (0.50) (0.44) (0.42) (0.33) (0.49)
EU 0.21 0.59 0.78 1.00 0.71 0.42 287
(0.41) (0.50) (0.42) (0.00) (0.49) (0.49)
US 0.27 0.26 0.65 1.00 0.78 0.34 159
(0.45) (0.44) (0.49) (0.00) (0.44) (0.48)
Japan 0.15 0.11 0.17 0.67 0.16 77
(0.36) (0.32) (0.41) (0.58) (0.37)
other 0.11 0.00 1.00 0.12 25
(0.32) (0.00) (0.00) (0.33)
Total 0.38 0.52 0.72 0.80 0.85 (0.50) 1648
(0.49) (0.50) (0.45) (0.40) (0.36) (0.50)
Obs 793 542 159 60 94 1648
Table shows the sample probability of litigation depending on the origin of the patent owner and the number of
forward citations. When sample probability of litigation is equal 1 (0) there are only observations in either the group
of litigated (unlitigated) patents. Standard errors in parentheses.
Tabelle 7: Sample Probability of Litigation by Portfolio Size and Firm Size of the patentee
Size Classes of Patentees
Patent Portfolio Individual Small Firm Medium-Sized Firm Large Frim Total Obs
0 to 10 0.32 0.80 0.56 0.52 0.53 634
(0.47) (0.40) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
11 to 250 0.12 0.70 0.54 0.53 0.53 633
(0.32) (0.46) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
251 to 1000 0.00 0.33 0.59 0.51 0.51 152
(0.00) (0.52) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
1001 to 2000 0.57 0.50 0.42 0.45 65
(0.53) (0.53) (0.50) (0.50)
more than 2000 0.43 0.70 0.20 0.29 164
(0.53) (0.47) (0.40) (0.46)
Total 0.27 0.73 0.55 0.44 0.50 1648
(0.45) (0.44) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Obs 274 294 497 583 1648
Table shows the sample probability of litigation depending on the size of the patent owner and the number of patents
in its portfolio. When sample probability of litigation is equal 1 (0) there are only observations in either the group
of litigated (unlitigated) patents. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Tabelle 8: Probit Estimation Specification: Probability of Patent Litigation
Parameter Marginal Effect Parameter Marginal Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FORW CIT D 0.112∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.006) (0.015) (0.006)
FORW CIT D+E SQU −0.002∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
BACKW CIT D+E 0.118∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.012) (0.031) (0.012)
BACKW CIT SQU −0.005∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
CLAIMS 0.015∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
FAMILY SIZE 0.020∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003)
PATENT PORTFOLIO −0.573∗∗∗ −0.229∗∗∗ −0.577∗∗∗ −0.230∗∗∗
(0.157) (0.062) (0.159) (0.063)
PATENT PORTFOLIO SQU 0.060∗∗ 0.064∗∗
(0.027) (0.027)
SMALL FIRM 1.134∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗ 1.092∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.034) (0.121) (0.035)
MEDIUM SIZE FIRM 0.682∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.039) (0.107) (0.040)
LARGE FIRM 0.706∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.627∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.040) (0.112) (0.042)
OWNER FOR EU −0.354∗∗∗ −0.140∗∗∗ −0.379∗∗∗ −0.150∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.037) (0.101) (0.039)
OWNER FOR US −0.742∗∗∗ −0.278∗∗∗ −0.757∗∗∗ −0.284∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.041) (0.130) (0.043)
OWNER FOR JP −1.026∗∗∗ −0.356∗∗∗ −0.990∗∗∗ −0.349∗∗∗
(0.196) (0.050) (0.197) (0.053)
OWNER FOR Other −1.029∗∗∗ −0.352∗∗∗ −0.919∗∗∗ −0.326∗∗∗
(0.340) (0.082) (0.339) (0.092)
EPO APPL −0.126 −0.050 −0.132 −0.053
(0.098) (0.039) (0.102) (0.040)
PCT APPL −0.108 −0.043 −0.120 −0.048
(0.176) (0.070) (0.183) (0.073)
OPPOSITION 0.995∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.032)
Continued on next page
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Tabelle 8 – continued from previous page
Parameter Marginal Effect Parameter Marginal Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CONSTANT −1.092∗∗∗ −1.091∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.112)
Wald-statistic (χ2(degrees of freedom))
Size variables 81.86(3)∗∗∗ 92.77(3)∗∗∗
Ownership variables 58.60(4)∗∗∗ 62.19(4)∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.18 0.22
Obs. 1648 1648
Notes: Dependent Variable: Patent Litigation (0/1). The reference patent is owned by an Individual from
Germany. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate that the parameter is significantly different
from zero at the 10%, 5%, 1% significance level.
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Tabelle 9: Probit Estimation Specification: Probability of Patent Litigation
using Patent Portfolio Classes
Parameter Marginal Effect
(1) (2)
FORW CIT D 0.098∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.006)
FORW CIT D+E SQU −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
BACKW CIT D+E 0.102∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.013)
BACKW CIT SQU −0.006∗∗ −0.002∗∗
(0.002) (0.001)
CLAIMS 0.015∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.002)
FAMILY SIZE 0.016∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.008) (0.003)
Patent PORT 11-250 −0.306∗∗∗ −0.121∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.033)
Patent PORT 251-1000 −0.330∗∗ −0.130∗∗
(0.138) (0.053)
Patent PORT 1001-2000 −0.400∗∗ −0.157∗∗
(0.188) (0.070)
Patent PORT >2000 −0.668∗∗∗ −0.254∗∗∗
(0.182) (0.063)
FOREIGN*PORTFOLIO 0.012 0.005
(0.246) (0.098)
DOMESTIC*PORTFOLIO −0.130∗ −0.052∗
(0.070) (0.028)
INDIVIDUAL
SMALL FIRM 1.186∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.034)
MEDIUM SIZE FIRM 0.755∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.041)
LARGE FIRM 0.816∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.045)
OWNER FOR EU −0.419∗∗∗ −0.165∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.039)
OWNER FOR US −0.776∗∗∗ −0.291∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.044)
OWNER FOR JP −1.047∗∗∗ −0.365∗∗∗
(0.211) (0.054)
OWNER FOR Other −1.015∗∗∗ −0.351∗∗∗
(0.344) (0.086)
EPO APPL −0.126ion −0.050
(0.103) (0.041)
PCT APPL −0.213 −0.084
(0.184) (0.073)
OPPOSITION 1.011∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.032)
CONSTANT −1.002∗∗∗
(0.115)
Wald-statistic (χ2(degrees of freedom))
Size variables 92.12(3)∗∗∗
Ownership variables 56.45(4)∗∗∗
Portfolio variables 21.31(4)∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.23
Obs. 1648
Notes: Dependent Variable: Patent Litigation (0/1). Portfolio Size is used as categorical variable in size
classes. The reference patent is owned by an Individual from Germany with a Patent Portfolio size less than
11. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate that the parameter is significantly different from zero
at the 10%, 5%, 1% significance level.
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